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Abstract (350 words) 15 
1. Globally, governments and regulators face an ongoing trade-off between meeting economic 16 
development needs and conserving biodiversity. Markets for biodiversity offsets are one tool which 17 
could secure biodiversity protection at lower costs to society whilst allowing some economic 18 
development to still take place.  19 
2. We provide a new perspective on biodiversity offset markets by focussing on what can be learnt 20 
from one of the best-researched environmental markets: the market for tradable pollution permits. 21 
We argue there are four key design parameters in terms of how and what to trade. These design 22 
parameters likely determine the ecological effectiveness and economic efficiency of any market in 23 
biodiversity offsets.  24 
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3. Policy Implications. Applying lessons from tradable pollution permit markets will be important if 25 
the benefits of biodiversity offset markets are to be realised more fully in future. A well-26 
functioning market for biodiversity offsets dually minimises the economic costs of preventing 27 
future losses in biodiversity due to development and provides an economic incentive for 28 
landowners to invest in biodiversity conservation. The most crucial aspect of the market is what to 29 
trade (the currency in the offset market), and this has significant implications on the other key 30 
aspects of market design; the trading ratio which governs the rate of exchange between offsets at 31 
different points in space and time; the scale of the market; and how the market is regulated.  We 32 
argue that markets function best where the conservation priority is a well-defined unit of 33 
biodiversity which can be readily measured and monitored. In situations where there are already 34 
strong regulations safeguarding biodiversity, the benefit of biodiversity offset markets is in 35 
reducing the aggregate costs of conservation. We believe biodiversity offset markets will offer the 36 
highest potential in developing countries with weaker environmental protection and a greater need 37 
to reconcile economic development needs with conservation under limited funding.  38 
Keywords 39 
biodiversity offsetting, conservation planning, conservation policy, environmental economics, offset 40 
policy, habitat banking 41 
42 
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1. Introduction 43 
Some parts of the world already have strong regulations protecting biodiversity, however, in 44 
developing countries especially, there are ongoing trade-offs between meeting economic development 45 
desires and securing biodiversity conservation (Rands et al. 2010). Lowering the perceived cost of 46 
conservation is crucial in helping to reduce these development-conservation conflicts (Buschke et al. 47 
2017). Markets for biodiversity offsets are one such tool to lower costs but identifying how this market-48 
like mechanism can be best implemented is a challenging task (Hanley et al. 2013). 49 
Biodiversity offsets compensate for unavoidable damage from development by providing 50 
measurable conservation gains and are considered the final option under the mitigation hierarchy, once 51 
measures to avoid, minimize and restore have been undertaken (ten Kate et al. 2004). Within the 52 
mitigation hierarchy, developers can offset directly or purchase offset credits from a third party provider 53 
who manages a parcel of land for its conservation value (ten Kate et al. 2014). Proponents of 54 
biodiversity offsetting argue that this allows for coordinated, large-scale restoration efforts which can 55 
provide quicker, more certain and cheaper conservation gains than site-by-site mitigation undertaken 56 
by developers (Levrel et al. 2017). Furthermore, the market aspect of biodiversity offsets provides an 57 
on-going financial incentive for land owners to invest in conservation (Squires & Garcia 2018).  58 
There have been numerous reviews of biodiversity offsetting, predominantly from the 59 
ecological perspective concerning the effectiveness of restoration, the functionality of restored systems 60 
compared to natural systems, how to assess ecological equivalency, and additionality (Bull et al. 2013; 61 
Bull et al. 2015; Bull et al. 2017; Maron et al. 2012; Quétier et al. 2014; Maron et al. 2015; Maron et 62 
al. 2016). Perspectives have also been offered from environmental law and policy (Salzman & Ruhl 63 
2000; Salzman & Ruhl 2006). However, there have been few contributions from the economics 64 
literature on the subject. This article extends the current literature by focussing on what can be learnt 65 
from one of the best known and researched environmental markets: the market for tradable pollution 66 
permits. We argue that valuable insights from theory and practice in the design of pollution permit 67 
markets can be applied to the design of biodiversity offset markets, particularly in terms of how and 68 
what to trade.  69 
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2. From Tradable Pollution Permits to Biodiversity Offset Markets 70 
This paper argues that much can be learned about better designs for biodiversity offsets from 71 
tradeable pollution permit markets (Crocker 1966). By “better designs”, we mean policies which 72 
achieve a higher degree of cost-saving whilst also meeting environmental targets. In a tradeable 73 
pollution permit market, a regulatory agency sets a cap (or limit) on overall emissions. Allowable 74 
emissions are then allocated to polluting firms freely or through auctions. Given their initial allocation, 75 
firms are then able to buy and sell permits in the market. Since the reduction in allowed total emissions 76 
creates scarcity, this stimulates emissions trading. There is usually significant heterogeneity in the 77 
marginal costs (the cost of reducing one more unit of emissions) between firms. It is this cost 78 
heterogeneity that generates the cost-savings to be reaped through permit trade. Firms that reduce 79 
emissions at the lowest marginal cost will sell permits, and firms with high marginal costs of reducing 80 
emissions will purchase permits. Through trading, well-functioning permit markets minimise the 81 
overall cost of achieving an emissions reduction target (de Vries & Hanley 2016). Fundamental to 82 
realising this cost-saving potential are transaction costs. For a market to function well there must be 83 
clearly defined property rights to facilitate the exchange of rights. Transaction costs are associated with 84 
defining, establishing, maintaining and exchanging such property rights (Stavins 1995). Higher 85 
transaction costs can inhibit both buyers and sellers from participating in a tradable permits market, so 86 
regulators must design trading programs with this in mind (Cason & Gangadharan 2003). 87 
The use of pollution markets has grown substantially since the 1980s. One successful market 88 
has been the US SO2 cap-and-trade scheme, introduced as part of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act 89 
Amendments. Its objective was to reduce total annual SO2 emissions from power stations by 10 million 90 
tonnes relative to 1980 levels, in a manner which balanced the need to cut emissions against the desire 91 
to avoid high costs to industry. Trading resulted in cost savings between 15%–90% relative to the costs 92 
of conventional forms of regulation (Schmalensee & Stavins 2013). High levels of compliance were 93 
achieved through rigorous monitoring and enforcement (Stavins 1998). Another successful market was 94 
the US Lead Phasedown Permit Market, begun in 1982. This market provided incentives for firms to 95 
adopt more efficient technology earlier than under increased regulatory stringency alone (Kerr & 96 
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Newell 2003). In contrast to the SO2 and Lead markets, markets for water pollution have had varying 97 
levels of success with fewer programmes implemented. Where markets have been created, these 98 
experience a much lower trading volume compared to air pollutant markets (Fisher-Vanden & Olmstead 99 
2013). Examples of water trading markets include the Fox River (Wisconsin) and the Dillon Reservoir 100 
programme (Colorado). More recently, regional, national and international permit trading of CO2 101 
emissions has emerged in Europe and the US. We find that increased regulatory stringency (which 102 
raised the effective price of lead) encouraged greater adoption of lead-reducing technology. We also 103 
show that larger and more technically sophisticated refineries were more likely to adopt the new 104 
technology. Importantly, we further find that the tradable permit system provided incentives for more 105 
efficient technology adoption decisions. 106 
Whilst tradeable pollution permit markets fix the total allowable level of emissions, the cap in 107 
a biodiversity offset market should relate to no net loss of a well-defined unit of biodiversity. Firms 108 
wishing to develop land would need to hold offset credits. These demonstrate the creation of additional 109 
conservation gains to compensate for damages caused by development. These credits would be provided 110 
by landowners who invest in restoration or protection actions, which earn them a financial return from 111 
the sale of credits. The price of credits should reflect the marginal cost of securing the offset, in the 112 
same way pollution permit prices reflect the marginal costs of reducing emissions. The magnitude of 113 
the potential cost savings offered by a market of this type relative to a no-trading alternative depends 114 
on how much variation there is in the costs of conserving the focal habitat or species across the 115 
landscape. Importantly, studies of conservation costs have revealed a high degree of heterogeneity 116 
(Armsworth 2014) suggesting large efficiency savings are possible from biodiversity offset trading 117 
schemes. However, the degree to which cost-savings are actually realised depends crucially on the 118 
degree and nature of offset trading.  119 
3.1 Policy Targets and Exchange Currencies 120 
Efficient markets require goods to be grouped into simple, measurable, standardised units so that 121 
they are fully exchangeable. The more diverse the units of exchange, the less efficient the market. 122 
Pollution markets arose in response to regulatory targets for emission reductions. The unit of emissions 123 
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formed the credit (e.g., one tonne of SO2 or CO2), which has proved to be a fungible currency. However, 124 
it is significantly more difficult to translate biodiversity into a simple exchange mechanism (Bull et al. 125 
2013).  126 
A regulatory target of “no net loss of biodiversity” is broad and may encompass many elements 127 
of the environment. It is hard to reduce these elements to one single, unique unit of exchange (Bull et 128 
al. 2015). This results in an ambiguity in the choice of the offset currency. Historically, many offset 129 
schemes have favoured aggregated currencies which bundle elements of biodiversity, allowing for the 130 
substitution of elements which supports market flexibility (Gardner et al. 2013; van Teeffelen et al. 131 
2014). However, these currencies run the risk of “out of kind trading” and are often critiqued for failing 132 
to secure no net loss (Bull et al. 2017). Habitat-based approaches were first used in US Wetland 133 
Mitigation Banking where credits were calculated using habitat acreage. More recently these have 134 
developed to take account of wetland functioning (Hough & Robertson 2009). A more complex habitat-135 
based approach has been applied to BioBanking in Australia where credit value is based on several site 136 
attributes and the profile of an offset credit must match the credit profile of the land area being 137 
developed. This results in a large number of credit profile combinations, making it difficult for 138 
developers and landowners to match their credits (OEHNSW 2014).   139 
Complexities in the definition of the unit of credit can have substantial impacts on the 140 
transaction costs. Increasingly complex offset currencies will have high requirements for data 141 
collection, reporting and monitoring. This increase in complexity will reduce gains from trade likely to 142 
be delivered (Woodward 2003). The success of the US Lead pollution market has been partly attributed 143 
to the ease of the monitoring and reporting requirements: refineries were responsible for self-monitoring 144 
and reporting but none of the requirements required more information than that which was already 145 
available (Hahn & Hester 1989). 146 
The frame of reference used to define No Net Loss or Net Gain should be clearly identified in 147 
the policy goal. Frames of reference include the baseline from which biodiversity loss is measured and 148 
counterfactual scenarios for the level of biodiversity if development had not taken place (Gibbons et al. 149 
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2016). This allows the policy to be evaluated in terms of whether its outcome is better for biodiversity 150 
than in the absence of offsets (ten Kate et al. 2014). We argue that offset markets should only be 151 
employed where there is a regulatory cap on some specified element of biodiversity which is readily 152 
quantifiable. This will allow the establishment of a relatively fungible currency for the market, and for 153 
less costly assessment, reporting and monitoring. For more complex policy goals encompassing many 154 
elements of biodiversity, offset markets may not be the best approach.   155 
3.2 Trading Ratios  156 
The trading ratio refers to the relative quantity/quality of biodiversity gained and lost at offset 157 
and impact sites (Bull et al. 2017). Ratios are needed to reflect the many potential sources of 158 
heterogeneity implicit in the definition of the offset currency. These include spatial variation linked to 159 
differences in habitats or species across space and differences in the timing of delivery of gains versus 160 
losses (McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Maron et al. 2012). Methods to calculate trading ratios have 161 
included Habitat Equivalency Analysis to account for spatial structures and connectivity in the 162 
landscape (Desvousges et al. 2018) and accounting for uncertainty and time discounting (Laitila et al. 163 
2014). The more complex the definition of the offset credit, the more likely that trading ratios will be 164 
required.  165 
The issue of trading ratios has been considered extensively in the pollution literature, due to 166 
spatial variation in the damage costs of air and water pollutants (Fowlie 2013). Trading ratios were 167 
originally developed for point-source air and water pollutants, where the effects of one unit of emissions 168 
on some measure of ambient air or water quality vary across space (Hanley et al. 1998). Trading ratios 169 
are key to the design of point-nonpoint source pollution trading in the U.S. and Australia (Horan & 170 
Shortle 2011). However, complex trading rules, designed to be consistent with the spatial variation in 171 
damage costs, have been shown to increase transactions costs, hence reducing market participation. 172 
This was particularly evident in both the Fox River and Dillon Reservoir water pollution markets. The 173 
Dillon Reservoir programme imposed a 2:1 trading ratio, which raised the price of trades and 174 
diminished the demand and number of trades that took place in the first 15 years of the scheme 175 
(Woodward, 2003). For the Fox River, just one trade took place during the whole lifetime of the scheme, 176 
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due to the complexity of the design of the scheme which required significant regulatory approval and 177 
created high transaction costs for firms (Atkinson & Tietenberg 1991). Strict regulatory requirements 178 
have also been a feature of offset markets in New South Wales Australia. Reviews of BioBanking have 179 
shown that many developers feel the strict offset requirements are a barrier to offsetting and instead 180 
choose alternative mitigation options. The current market has a low offset supply which is limiting 181 
transactions and failing to produce the cost-savings initially anticipated (OEHNSW 2014). 182 
Offset markets work best when the currency is a readily measurable habitat or species. In turn, 183 
this reduces the needs for overly complex trading ratios. Moreover, we recommend that offset credits 184 
are only exchanged when the environmental outcomes (gains) have been certified (Bekessy et al. 2010). 185 
This eliminates uncertainty over whether an offset project (or portfolio of projects) will deliver 186 
biodiversity benefits and limit the predictive modelling required to calculate losses and gains. This 187 
already happens under US Wetland Mitigation Banking where a credit release schedule is defined at 188 
the outset of the project. The schedule should reserve a significant share of credits to be released only 189 
after the achievement of ecological performance criteria, although some advanced credit release is 190 
permitted to foster investment (McKenney & Kiesecker 2010).  191 
3.3 Market Scale and Trading Volume 192 
Successful pollution markets are those featuring a significant number of potential participants. 193 
In thin markets, comprising only a few buyers and sellers, trading may be inhibited and the performance 194 
of the market can suffer. In the US, SO2 markets have been more successful in reducing compliance 195 
costs and meeting emission reduction targets than water pollution markets, due to the absence of 196 
geographic limits imposed on the SO2 market and thus a large number of potential traders participating. 197 
Water pollution trades are restricted to the watershed only so that firms have more limited trading 198 
options. Moreover, thin markets are more vulnerable to the exercise of market power by individual 199 
traders (Fisher-Vanden & Olmstead 2013). 200 
Many existing biodiversity offset markets have similar geographic restrictions to water 201 
pollutant markets. From an ecological perspective, larger geographical markets run the risk of offsetting 202 
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being too far removed from the development site, leading to concerns over changes in the functional 203 
quality and scale of the traded habitats (BenDor & Brozović 2007). This can be overcome in principle 204 
by using a trading ratio accounting for locational differences. Smaller geographic areas, however, limit 205 
the scope for trading. For example, the UK biodiversity offset pilot primarily restricted trades to within 206 
the local authority area and failed to create a single exchange, given the limited number of buyers and 207 
sellers (Baker et al. 2013; Carlos 2017). In contrast, The US Wetland Mitigation Banking Market 208 
operates over much larger service areas.  209 
 The second concern regarding large offset markets is how these change access to biodiversity 210 
for people living closest to the planned development (BenDor & Stewart 2011). This is even more 211 
challenging in developing countries, where people are often more dependent on natural resources and 212 
poorly executed offsets could exacerbate poverty (Griffiths et al 2018). Griffiths et al (2018) argue that 213 
a no-worse-off principle should be applied: social gains from new offsets must be at least equal to any 214 
social losses arising from development. This additional principle will add a further layer of complexity 215 
to the offset system, potentially requiring reduced geographic markets and/or further trading ratios to 216 
account for locational differences between affected persons.  217 
 Despite these concerns, we would advocate creating at the minimum a regional offset market 218 
embedded in a broader landscape plan. This offers the opportunity for thicker markets to develop with 219 
more traders and allows for less volatile price signals, reducing uncertainty for investors in conservation 220 
(Wissel & Wätzold 2010). From an ecological perspective, isolated offset projects are more likely to 221 
fail when compared to a project that is incorporated into a larger, ecosystem-based conservation bank 222 
or regional conservation plan. In contrast, a habitat or species which is found in a limited or niche area 223 
offers fewer opportunities for creating offset sites, increasing the costs of degrading these habitat types 224 
to the point where development may no longer be viable. 225 
3.4 Regulating the market 226 
An ongoing concern with biodiversity offsetting is that it provides an incentive for quick and 227 
cheap mitigation: whilst both offset providers and buyers are price conscious, neither need be quality 228 
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conscious (Wainger et al. 2010). To resolve this, adequate governance, monitoring and enforcing of 229 
offsets needs to be developed through a range of legal and financial tools. However, this means that the 230 
regulatory capacity needed to administer biodiversity offset markets is high and may not exist in all 231 
countries (ten Kate et al. 2014). Moreover, higher regulatory and reporting requirements typically result 232 
in higher transactions costs, reducing the gains from participating in an offset market (Stavins 1995). 233 
In the pollution permit market, brokers provide information on potential trading partners in 234 
order to reduce search costs for firms. A clearinghouse buys pollution reduction credits and then sells 235 
these to polluters needing to purchase credits (Stavins 1995). The equivalent could be devised for a 236 
biodiversity offset market where the regulator provides or facilitates a clearinghouse which buys the 237 
certified offset credits from landowners and then sells these on to developers needing to purchase 238 
credits. The regulator ensures adequate monitoring and reporting at the level of individual offset 239 
projects through the oversight of this clearinghouse. This not only reduces transaction costs but also 240 
ensures that credits are only being sold when they provide the required biodiversity value (Woodward 241 
& Kaiser 2002). 242 
A further difference between the pollution permit markets and current biodiversity offset 243 
markets is the often-voluntary nature of biodiversity offset markets. One of the reasons behind the 244 
success of the SO2 market was that firms were mandated to acquire credits, or else to cut their emissions 245 
(Stavins 1998). In contrast, developers can choose to purchase compensatory offsets as the final stage 246 
under the mitigation hierarchy but can also choose to undertake their own mitigation. As such, there is 247 
a limited business case to motivate landowners, communities and NGOs to invest in long-term activities 248 
to provide offset banks (ten Kate et al. 2014). One perspective is to re-consider the traditional 249 
application of the mitigation hierarchy by allowing developers to choose a “best package” of 250 
conservation outcomes from avoid, minimize, restore and offset. Relaxing the hierarchy to allow 251 
developers to choose whether they avoid, minimize, restore or purchase offsets may offer a potential 252 
net gain for conservation activities as developers can choose to send funds to the least cost conservation 253 
activity (Squires & Garcia 2014).  254 
3. Conclusions 255 
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This paper analyses key parameters for biodiversity offset markets based on insights from theory 256 
and practice in tradeable pollution markets. We have shown that the most effective pollution permit 257 
markets engage with a wide number of participants and operate under simple trading rules to reduce 258 
transaction costs. Biodiversity offset market regulators need to design schemes which encourage 259 
participation and foster the development of a market. The key design parameters we identify are i) 260 
policy targets and exchange currencies: the unit of exchange should be determined by the regulatory 261 
cap for a specified aspect of biodiversity where data can be readily collected and monitoring take place 262 
with relative ease. ii) the trading ratio: we recommend using as simple a scheme of trading ratios as 263 
consistent with the environmental objective, to avoid increasing transactions costs. iii) Market scale and 264 
trading volume: we would advocate creating a regional offset market embedded in a broader landscape 265 
plan to maintain an adequate scale of offset market whilst minimising uncompensated local impacts. 266 
iv) Regulating the market: the regulator should provide or enable a clearinghouse or bank(s) for offset 267 
trades, similar to a tradable pollution market.  268 
Can biodiversity offset markets prove to be a cost-effective conservation mechanism? In 269 
situations where there are already strong regulations safeguarding biodiversity, the benefit of 270 
biodiversity offset markets is in reducing the aggregate costs of conservation. If an appropriate 271 
geographic scale is chosen for biodiversity offset markets, there may also be benefits in terms of more 272 
coordinated conservation. However, these potential benefits must be weighed against the risk of 273 
slippage in poorly-designed or regulated markets. Potentially bigger biodiversity gains through 274 
offsetting can be reaped in places where strong biodiversity protection measures do not yet exist and 275 
where finding a means to reduce perceived “biodiversity versus development” conflicts will be key to 276 
convincing reluctant regulators to implement stricter protection measures. For these gains to be realised, 277 
markets must be designed in a way which enhances the chances of cost-saving trades. This paper shows 278 
that we can learn from tradeable pollution markets how to enhance biodiversity offset markets in a way 279 
that does not undermine conservation goals. 280 
 281 
282 
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